Millennium Development Goals:Towards a post-2015 development agenda for South Africa*Vusi Gumede, University of South Africa**

1. Introduction

Notwithstanding relatively impressive rates of economic growth in Africa in the past ten years or so, poverty and inequality, however measured, have remained stubbornly high. It is expected that economic growth would remain positive and robust in most parts of Africa. For instance, the African Development Bank (AfDB), in the 2014 Africa Economic Outlook report placed 2013 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Sub-Saharan Africa at 5% and projects 2014 GDP to be about 5.8%. However, income poverty might increase given the domestic challenges confronting most of countries in Africa – income inequality would most likely remain unchanged if it does not get worse. The labour markets in Africa are largely to blame for this: many people are losing jobs and or labour markets are not absorbing many of those, including graduates, in search of jobs, hence high income poverty. As the economy performs better, in the midst of poverty, those already well off get even more better off, hence high income inequality. Arguably, poverty and inequality in Africa are structural: the structures of African economies make it difficult to reduce income poverty and inequality. I will say more about this later.

Poverty is bad, and there is no debate about that. With regard to inequality, some economists argue that it is the character of inequality that matters and that at early stages of development inequality is inevitable. Interestingly, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Picket (2010), in their insightful book though without caveats, argue that inequality in itself, not the character of it per se, is bad for any society. It is also important to acknowledge that, as Joseph Stiglitz (2012) demonstrates in the case of United States, inequality slows economic growth and can result to economic instability, and that it is dangerous for political stability. It might very well be that it is because of inequality in Africa too that economic growth is below potential as I have argued (see Gumede, 2013). In addition, there are both political and practical reasons why we should worry about poverty and inequality in Africa – the African continent has endured many centuries of exploitation!

This paper indicates, through selected human development indicators, that poverty and inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remain at worrying levels. The paper demonstrates that positive economic outlook has not played a (significant) role in reducing poverty and inequality in Africa – instead the poor continues to be marginalised and inequality continues to widen. The relationship between economic growth, poverty and inequality is well captured by Martin Ravallion (2007), concluding that

High initial inequality makes poverty less responsive to growth…the higher the initial inequality, the less the poor will share in the gains from growth. Unless there is sufficient change in distribution, people who have larger initial share of the pie will tend to gain a larger share in the pie's extension. This has been the case in majority of sub-Saharan African states and in southern Africa in particular, where countries have enjoyed length periods GDP growth and economic stability but poverty and inequality levels continue to be high.
(Martin Ravallion, 2007: 182)

The paper, as the title suggests, covers poverty and inequality trends in Southern Africa. Before concluding the paper, I provide some insights on why, from a theoretical perspective, poverty and inequality are not declining in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as well as what should entail the post-2015 development agenda for Africa broadly. This is in the context that the target date for Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) according to the Millennium Declaration is 2015.

2. Poverty

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), in its recent report on MDGs, summarises progress as having been "uneven and slow" though "Africa has made significant progress towards the MDGs" (UNECA, 2014: 1). This, as indicated earlier, is in spite of positive economic outlook projected for the continent. The 2011 AfDB report on regional integration explains that "southern African region presents a formidable market. The region is home to 16.7% of the continent's population, and is responsible for over 40% of Africa's GDP, valued at US$430 billion" (p. iii). The AfDB (2011) further notes that southern Africa is well-endowed in a variety of natural resources, it presents numerous prospects for energy generation, agriculture and agro-processing. However, the population living in severe poverty in southern Africa is very high.

As Table 1 demonstrates, 30% of population in low human development countries such as Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania lives in severe poverty. Whereas the population living in severe poverty in the remaining states continues to hover above 10% and 20% with the exception of the only two high human development countries. Economic growth is clearly not benefiting the majority of citizens in southern Africa. As indicated earlier, this has to do with the structures of economies of the African continent. Adebayo Adedeji, in his Statement to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in Geneva in July 12 1979, made a profound point, among others, that "Africa needs complete restructuring and transformation of its political economies from dependent to self-reliant ones".

The structure of the African economy is simply a legacy of colonialism. Because African economies were configured as satellite economies, they predominantly rely on a few sectors of the economy. I must hasten to add that the structure of an economy should be viewed not only in terms of sectoral diversification – ownership of the means of production as well as linkages among the sub-sectors is equally important. For Africa, on one hand, the economies or the labour markets are not creating jobs which could dent structural poverty. On the other hand, the structures of the economies reproduce inequality through benefiting those with certain skills or political connections while keeping the rest of societies at lower levels of economic or financial wellbeing.

Table 1: Human Development Indicators in Southern Africa

Country	Population living in Severe Poverty (%MPI)	Life Expectancy Rate (%)		Child Malnutrition (%)		HIV/AIDS Prevalence (% ages 15-24)	
		Female	Male	Stunting (Moderate or Severe)	Overweight (Moderate or Severe)	Female	Male
High Human Development							
Mauritius	No Data	77.1	70.3	No Data	No Data	0.3%	0.3%
Seychelles	No Data	78.1	69.0	No Data	No Data	No Data	No Data
Medium Human Development							
Botswana	No Data	66.8	62.1	31.4	11.2	6.7	3.7
South Africa	1.3%	58.8	54.7	33	19.2	13.9	3.9
Namibia	No Data	67.1	61.7	29	4.6	4.1	2.2
Zambia	31.3	60	56.3	45.4	7.9	4.6	3.5
Low Human Development							
Swaziland	7.4	48.3	49.6	30.9	10.7	20	10.3
Angola	No Data	53.4	50.4	29	No Data	1.2	0.6
Lesotho	18.2	49.5	49.2	39	7.3	10.7	5.8
Mozambique	44.1	51	49.3	42.6	7.4	6.6	2.8
Zimbabwe	12.2	60.8	58.8	32	5.5	6.3	3.9
Malawi	29.8	55.4	55.1	47.1	8.3	4.5	2.7
Tanzania	32.1	62.9	60.2	42	5	3.6	1.8
Congo (Democratic Republic)	46.2	51.8	48.2	43.4	4.9	0.8	0.4

Source: United Nations Development Programme (2014)

Many countries in Africa have very high Multidimensional Poverty Indices as Table 1 shows, for those countries with data/estimates. In Mozambique and the Congo, for instance, the Multidimensional Poverty Indices are above 40%, implying that many people in these countries endure multiple deprivations in relation to education, health and standard of living. The severity of the poverty in southern Africa becomes even clearer when analysing Figure 1, showing poverty headcount_. The number of southern African states whose population lives on less than US$1.25 a day is also above 40% for majority of the selected southern African states with the highest being Malawi at above 70%. As Figure 1 also demonstrates, only two of the selected southern African states have a lower number of people living on less than US$1.25 a day; South Africa at 10% and Seychelles at below 5%.

Figure 1: Poverty Headcount Ratio for Selected Southern African States, 2000-2009

Source: UNDP Africa Human Development Report, 2012

The figures presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 demonstrate that the region is far off the mark in achieving Goal One of the MDGs: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 (UNECA, 2013). Similar to the rest of the continent, southern Africa is not meeting MDGs.

2.1 Food Security

This section looks at household food expenditure, drawing from the 2013 AfroBarometer Survey conducted in 34

SSA countries. The recent *Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan* of the *Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) says* that “the entire land mass of the region comprises 906,324,000 square kilometre or 30.9 percent of the total African land mass. Of this, 226,581,000 hectares (25%) is arable and 48,653,300 hectares is in cultivation.” The 2012 African Human Development Report defines food security as “the condition when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”
Despite the region being endowed with rich arable land, guaranteeing food security for millions of southern African people continues to be a challenge. This challenge is captured in Figure 2 showing numbers of undernourished people in southern Africa between 2000 and 2013. Tanzania has the highest number of undernourished people with over 14 million of its citizens being reported as being undernourished. It is followed by Mozambique (eight million), Angola (six million), Madagascar and Zambia (four million). This figure poses a serious challenge if the region is to increase life expectancy rates, reduce child malnutrition rates and also tackle the scourge of HIV/AIDS (see Table 1).

Figure 2: Number of Undernourished People

Source: Food and Agricultural Organisation (2014)

According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (2014), women are more at risk of experiencing the challenge of food insecurity than men. Rapid urbanisation in southern Africa has led to an increasing migration to cities, as the Africa Food Security Urban Network (2011) found – in the 11 southern African cities where the survey was conducted, a majority of the households (34%) were female-headed households compared to only 12% of the surveyed households having a male-headed household. The findings from the Africa Food Security Urban Network (2011) therefore confirm that women are more susceptible to experiencing poverty, malnourishment and illnesses compared to their males. As indicated earlier, considering the fact that women also have high prevalence rate of contracting HIV/AIDS (as shown in Table 1) food insecurity in such households poses another risk of women having to succumb to the illness due to inadequate or poor diet and living behind child-headed households.

The prevalence of food inadequacy, as the Food and Agricultural Organisation (2014) report shows, is significant. The majority of southern African countries are vulnerable to experiencing food shortages, which will further dampen efforts to eradicating poverty and achieving the MDG of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. Another factor that leads to majority of southern African countries being susceptible to food inadequacy is the reliance on food aid deliveries from western countries, which makes southern African countries even more vulnerable to external shocks such as droughts and low production of agricultural products in the West. Amongst some of the heavily depended southern African countries on food aid is Zimbabwe with an estimated total tonnes of food aid delivered in 2009, during the peak of the political and economic crisis, at 220.45 thousand tonnes of food aid. Slightly less than 180 thousand tonnes and 160 thousand tonnes of food aid were delivered in 2009 to Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, respectively. The rest of the remaining countries receive food aid on an annual basis to supplement their food supplies. However, Botswana, South Africa, Mauritius and Seychelles do not receive any food aid at all (Africa Human Development Report, 2012).

1. *Social Security*

Otoo and Boateng (2012) describe social security as a set of benefits provided by the state, the market of a combination of both to individuals or households to mitigate possible hardships resulting from reduction or loss in income. This may be the result of sickness, maternity, employment injury, invalidity, old age or death. In southern Africa, however, the Code on Social Security in the SADC, cited in Mpedi and Smit (2011: 10), provides a comprehensive description of social security as “public and private, or to mixed public and private measures, designed to protection individuals and families against income insecurity caused by contingencies such as unemployment, employment injury, maternity, sickness, invalidity, old age and death”. The main objectives of social security, as captured in Mpedi and Smit (2011), are: (a) to maintain income, (b) to provide healthcare, and (c) to provide benefits to families. Conceptually, social security includes social insurance, social assistance and social allowances. Another regional document detailing out social security is the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC, also cited in Mpedi and Smit (2011).

The SADC Secretariat has made progressive strides in ensuring that social security is central to the human development of the region, at least on paper. However, there is much more to be desired on the ground in order to realise the domestication of the SADC Code on Social Security and Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC. The International Labour Organisation provides a breakdown of existing social security programmes available in the 14 SADC member states, as shown in Table 2. As Table 2 shows, about 90% of the region has successfully domesticated access to Old Age, Invalidity and Survivors Benefits and 100% of the southern African states provide for Employment Accident and Occupational Disease Benefits and 70% provides for Medical Care and Sickness Benefits.

Table 2: Access to Social Security by Citizens in Southern African Countries

Country	Social Assistance	Unemployment Benefit	Employment Accident and Occupational Disease Benefit	Old Age, Invalidity and Survivors Benefit	Medical Care and Sickness Benefits
High Human Development					
Mauritius	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Seychelles	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Medium Human Development					
Botswana	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
South Africa	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Namibia	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zambia	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Low Human Development					
Swaziland	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Lesotho	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Mozambique	No	No	No	No	Yes
Congo (Democratic Republic)	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Malawi	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Madagascar	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Zimbabwe	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tanzania	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: International Labour Organisation, NATLEX 2014

However, there is much to be desired in making provision for social assistance and unemployment benefit. Only six out of the fourteen southern African states have made provision for social assistance and also only three out of the fourteen southern African states have made provision for unemployment benefit. However, despite stride made in ensuring provision for social security in the region a majority of citizens continue to live in poverty – there are many people that are still not accessing social insurance in southern Africa. Otoo and Boateng (2012: 14) argue that “on average, mandatory social security reaches less than one-tenth of the labour force in sub-Saharan Africa and the coverage continues to deteriorate particularly after the 1980s”.

3. Inequality

1. *Income Inequality in SADC*

Southern Africa is characterised by skewed distribution of resources and income and the majority of the people is excluded from accessing land and controlling the economy. The challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality continues to hamper progress in uplifting the majority of southern African citizens from economic hardship. Statistics and research demonstrate that despite high growth rates, and the presence of increasing middle class, unemployment, poverty and inequality may have worsened in the past decade. The theoretical section, later, explains why this might be the case. At a simplistic level, perhaps, economic growth has not been inclusive, the labour market is not functioning effectively and the so-called middle class is a fuss.

Figure 3 demonstrates the extent of the challenge of inequality experienced in the region. South Africa, Namibia and Seychelles have the highest Gini-coefficients at above 0.60 whilst other southern African countries have Gini-coefficients around 0.40 and 0.50. This situation is glaringly worsened by income differentials between high income earners and low income earners as Figure 4 demonstrates.

Figure 3: Gini Coefficient, 2003-2012

Source: UNDP Africa Human Development Report, 2012

The major contributing factor to such high wage differentials is that there are many unemployed people compared to the few employed. This can also be directly linked to high economic growth rates that benefit the political elite and middle class whilst the majority of the unemployed continue to face challenges in making a decent living and earning a living.

Figure 4: Inequality in Income, 2013

Source: UNDP, 2014

Jaunch and Muchena (2011: 10) argue that high inequalities in southern Africa are due to “grafted capitalism”, which did not transform the economy as a whole but only a small formal enclave sector, thus failing to produce dynamic growth and development. The second factor driving inequalities can be linked to challenges in labour market access, where a majority of the youth population struggles in getting employed due to mismatch in skills with what is available in the labour market. This, therefore, leads to high unemployment rates amongst youth population and the resulting factor being an increasing in the so-called Not in Employment, not in Education and not in Training (NEET).

Theoretical reflections

The question naturally arises as to why is sub-Saharan Africa or Africa in general remaining with the higher levels of poverty and inequality described earlier. There is a general tendency to blame Africa’s woes, perhaps simplistically, on corruption, weak leadership, policy constraints, geography etc (see Gumede, 2013). This is not to say that weak leadership and such are not constraints – they are just not binding constraints to Africa’s development. Indeed, corruption, which has led to the pauperisation of the citizens, has been a significant factor. Also, dependence on aid and foreign assistance has also obfuscated development on the continent. It may be important at this point to indicate that socioeconomic development is understood as an effect or outcome, through various mechanisms, which results to the improvement on the lives of the people. Development, broadly, according to Claude Ake (1996: 125), “is the process by which people create and recreate themselves and their life circumstances to realise higher levels of civilisation in accordance with their own choices and values – development is something that people must do for themselves…”

As argued elsewhere, the fundamental developmental challenge for Africa has to do with what Adebayo Adedeji calls the *Global Merchant System* – a deliberate design by the global capitalist order to perpetuate a socio-economic and political system that advances interests of the West and maintains the peripheralisation of the African continent. Decolonial thought scholars talk of *Colonial Matrixes of Power* – mechanisms that perpetuate coloniality. Therefore, at issue is the need for complete decolonisation and deimperialisation of the global order. Because of the *Global Merchant System* and *Colonial Matrixes of Power* the various poverty reduction strategies, and those aimed at redressing inequality, that have been put in place since the dawn of political independence in Africa have not successfully developed the continent and Africans. The nationalist leaders that fought for independence from the colonial masters can be said to have been driven by a passion to develop the various countries on the continent but their efforts have effectively come to naught. In the first decade of independence various countries in Africa recorded levels of growth that were comparable to other parts of the developing world (Adedeji, 2002). However, this achievement did not last long as the combination of domestic and international forces and the political economy conditioning these countries effectively emasculated the process of development on the continent, hence poverty and inequality remain very high.

As Claude Ake (1996) argues, the structural disarticulation that the colonial administrations created for post-independence Africa emanates from an extractive and exploitative economic system that was practiced on the continent. The colonial administrations were basically interested in mineral exploitation. This logic of exploitation informed the type of infrastructure that they put in place in the form of roads, rail system and ports. Besides, Claude Ake further argues that the introduction of wage labour, which was occasioned by taxation, led to rural-urban migration. This singular act grossly dislocated the prospect of an agrarian revolution, which should ordinarily precede industrial revolution (Ake, 1996). There were many distortions that colonisers introduced to Africa's natural economy, as Archie Mafeje (2003) argues in the case of land ownership. Mahmood Mamdani (1996) attributes the inability to successfully transform Africa to what he calls 'bifurcated power' which was not dismantled in post-colonial Africa.

In short, the exogenous factors that have shaped development in post-colonial Africa can be divided into different phases: global politics of the Cold War, the oil crisis of the 1970s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumph of market capitalism over socialism in an era of neo-liberal hegemony (see Spero and Hart, 2010). However, the totality of the failure of development strategies in Africa can be traced to the incomplete decolonisation of the political economy, knowledge production, mental constructs (especially of the leaders), culture and language on the continent (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). Claude Ake (1996: 18), though arguing that the "main obstacle to development in Africa is political", however insists that "it is [was] not so much that the development project failed [in Africa] as that it never got started in the first place."

Based on the 1981 Berg Report – entitled *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* – prepared for the World Bank, the state in Africa was seen as the major obstacle to economic development on the continent. The Report coincided with the ascendancy of neo-liberal economic doctrine as the philosophical touchstone for economic development both in the North and the South (Harvey, 2007). The need to remove the so-called distortions created by the state led to the recommendation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that Africa needed, in order to overcome its development challenges, to reduce the role of the state in economic management. It was argued that the role of the state should be limited to providing a conducive environment for business to thrive in the form of security of investment, provision and protection for property rights as well as provision of law and order. Economic policies such as liberalisation of finance, trade, investment, deregulation and privatisation were recommended as necessary requirements for facilitating economic growth and development (World Bank, 1981).

These policies were not just recommended but were made part of the conditionalities for accessing loans and development assistance from the World Bank and associated institutions as well as by the so-called developed countries. The package of reform associated with this policy was implemented under the structural adjustment programmes in Africa. As several African scholars have argued, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) did not just fail to bring about socio-economic development in Africa, SAPs effectively emasculated and destroyed the capacity of the state to plan and implement development strategies on the continent. It also facilitated further asymmetric insertion of African countries into the global capitalist system (See for instance, Olukoshi, 1995; Soludo and Mkandawire, 1989; Mkandawire, 2001; Shivji, 2009), hence poverty and inequality remaining very high in Africa.

That said, the culpability of African leaders in surrendering the development process on the continent to the logic of global capital cannot be denied, as discussed by George Ayittey (2005) and many others. Post-independence African leaders have surreptitiously and possibly also inadvertently formed alliances with global capital in what William Robinson (2004) calls the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC). Susan Strange (1994) talks of internationalisation of production networks as an inevitable outcome of global capitalism in which corporations seek outlets for cheap labours, higher returns on investments, freer regime of trade, investment and capital. It is in this context that the development process in Africa cannot make sense until there is a conscious effort to decolonise the process itself, among many aspects of Africa that need complete liberation.

The decolonisation process must involve deconstruction of the mentality of the African leaders, despatialisation of the arbitrary and artificial boundaries that the colonialists bequeathed on Africa and intellectual redirection of the orientation of the citizens from waiting to act by holding the government accountable at all levels. As George Ayittey (2005: 91-92) puts it:

The nationalist leaders, with few exceptions, adopted the wrong political systems, the wrong economic system, the wrong ideology and took the wrong path. Equally grievous, perhaps, was the low calibre of leadership…the leadership lacked basic understanding of the development process.

Concluding remarks

So, what is to be done, perhaps in the meantime, in the context of the post-2015 development agenda for Africa? The fundamental challenges that confront Africa, particularly the south of the Sahara, require the reconfiguration of global politico-economic relations. Essentially, the global and or geopolitical distribution of power must redress the peripheralisation of the African continent, and the Global South in general. As the works of Sabelo Ndlovu-

Gatsheni, John Saul, Adebayo Adedeji, Samir Amin, Issa Shivji and many others suggest, what is needed is the complete decolonisation and deimperialisation of the global order. This is overdue, so is the need to end the unholy alliance between (post-independence) African leaders and global capital. Also, as argued elsewhere (see Gumede, 2011), Africa needs its own socio-economic development approach, informed by a new vision for the African economy. I have described the new approach, or philosophical framework, for socio-economic development in Africa as an African Economic Renaissance (see Gumede, 2013).

Given that what needs to be done is humongous and requires extensive mobilisation and consciousness, in the meantime, as argued elsewhere, Africa should at minimum get policy right and pursue implementation effectively. In the case of poverty and inequality, Africa should design and implement the policies and strategies that address the various dimensions of poverty and the different aspects of inequality. At minimum, based on proper understanding the dynamics of poverty for each African country, anti-poverty strategies that correctly target those disaffected should be implemented. With regards to inequality, correct redistribution strategies should be implemented.

In a nutshell, appropriate policies should be implemented. Policies are considered inappropriate or weak if they are not cognisant of particular contexts. The global environment, the domestic context, and other contexts change overtime but policy changes or shifts (i.e. reforms) and their sequencing are generally not alive to changing contexts. Therefore, the post-2015 development agenda has to ensure that correct policies are in place – this implies that African governments should improve policy making capacities: economic policies need to be improved and social policies have to be robust as well as labour market policies should be ameliorated. Most importantly, social and economic policies have to work together for reducing poverty and inequality. Of critical importance though, in the longer term, from a policy perspective, is the restructuring of African economies to address structural poverty and inequality.

Needless to say, over and above policy and or policy reforms, implementation should be improved. In the short to medium-term, African governments should do more to protect the vulnerable; those said to be ‘the poorest of the poor’. Generally, more should be done to ensure the protection of children, the elderly and people with disabilities. African governments should pay more attention to improving access to jobs, especially for youth and women through a partnership between government, organised labour and the private sector, including small and medium enterprises. The post-2015 development agenda for Africa should prioritise socio-economic challenges that relate to poverty reduction and income inequality.

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Africa, like many other regions or continents, is huge and diverse. Countries in Africa differ in many ways and sub-regions of the continent also differ significantly. The focus is on the south of the Sahara (sub-Saharan Africa). The notion of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), though ideologically contentious, is useful for analytical purposes. Sub-Saharan African economies warrant special focus given the peculiar socio-economic challenges they face, which North Africa and Middle East (NAME) do not endure or rather the nature of the socio-economic challenges, developments and prospects differ between SSA and NAME. However, with regard to a development agenda it should be acceptable to think of an approach for the entire continent.

This data is for year 2013. As the Human Development Reports (HDRs) explain, the Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), on the other hand, identifies multiple deprivations in the same households in education, health and standard of living.

The Headcount Index (generally denoted by *P0*) measures the proportion of the population whose consumption (or other measures of standard of living) is less than the poverty line. There are many measures of poverty (and inequality) – care needs to be taken in interpreting estimates of any one particular measure. The international poverty (datum) line that is now used is US$1.25.

Refer to SADC (2003), Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. Available online at: http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf

Social assistance refers to a form of social security which provides assistance in cash or in kind to persons who lack the means to support themselves and their dependants. Social assistance is means-tested and is funded from government revenues. The objective of social assistance is to alleviate poverty through, amongst other things, the provision of minimum income support (See the Code on Social Security in the SADC).

NATLEX is the database of national labour, social security and related human rights legislation maintained by the International Labour Organisation International Labour Standards Department.

See Gumede (2014a) on the analysis of land and agrarian reforms in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The Gini Coefficient ranges between 0.0 and 1 – perfect income inequality would have Gini coefficient of 1 and perfect equality would be 0. Another economic measure of inequality is the Lorenz Curve which is a graphical representation of the relationship between the cumulative percentage of income and the cumulative percentage of (ordered) population

NEETS (Not in Education, Employment or Training) is a proportion of youth aged 15-24 years who are not in education, employment or training.

Coloniality essentially refers to the colonisers' suppression of African cultures, languages, worldviews (beliefs and value systems), the production of indigenous knowledge and meaning; painting them as inferior and primitive. On the other hand, presenting those of the colonisers as superior and rational and imposing them on the oppressed (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).

Those working on these issues (see, for instance, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and John Saul) have proposed how complete liberation could come about. I however think there is a need for a practical programme of action, over and above epistemic 'revolution', that needs to be put in place. In particular, raising critical consciousness of Africans and liberating their/our minds should be a key component of such a programme of action – Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (1986) provides powerful pointers on what should be done in 'decolonising the mind' of an African.

As Mamdani (1996) puts it, "although the bifurcated state created with colonialism was deracialised after independence, it was not democratised… [nationalist governments] sought to reform the bifurcated state that institutionally crystallised a state-enforced separation, of the rural from the urban and of one ethnicity from another…reproduced a part of that legacy, thereby creating its own variety of despotism". Mamdani concludes that "without a reform of the local state democratisation will remain not only superficial but also explosive." Michael Chege, in a review of Mamdani's book in *African Studies Quarterly* (Vol 1, 1997), summarises Mamdani's argument as saying that "the institutional framework of rule enshrined in apartheid and in all late colonialism, hinged especially on its use of indirect rule over the natives by local chiefs using customary law. This in turn dichotomized African societies into citizens (those above the writ of customary laws, enjoying some civil liberties, and mostly white), and subjects (primarily peasant households in the countryside) who faced the wrath and arbitrariness of native authorities, chiefs and their retinues" – Chege questions this, by the way.

African economic renaissance implies that Africans should decide on the African economy and or the socio-economic system that works for them. The point of departure is that Africans have had, priori to colonialism and imperialism, an economy and an economic system that worked well for them. For more, see Gumede, V (2013), African Economic Renaissance as a Paradigm for Africa's Socio-Economic Development. In Kondlo, K (Ed), *Perspectives in Thought Leadership for Africa's Renewal*, Pretoria: AISA Press. Pp 484-507