



Presidencies and Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa

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Abstract

From a policy perspective, the question naturally arises as to whether there have been major changes in policy making and associated issues in South Africa since 1994. Arguably, the first five years or so focused on institutional reforms and legislative interventions. In the late 1990s the South African government established specific processes and institutions for policy development and coordination. In 2005-6, specific processes and institutions for long-term planning and monitoring and evaluation were formally established. The paper examines the evolution of policy making and coordination in South Africa since the late 1990s, it also reflects on monitoring and evaluation as well as long-term planning. The erstwhile Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS), which had been the main engine of policy (coordination and other aspects) in post-apartheid South Africa that was established towards the end of 1997 in the Office of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki (at the time) was disbanded in 2010. The PCAS, popularly known as the Policy Unit, coordinated all policies and reforms, and led in planning as well as monitoring and evaluation, among other responsibilities. From 2010, functions were institutionalised or strengthened (e.g. government departments have been established to deal with planning as well as monitoring and evaluation). There have not been major shifts and/or changes in policy coordination, planning as well as monitoring and evaluation since the late 1990s. However, there appears to be a shift in emphasis to focusing more on implementation. This might have been one of the biggest mistakes of the Jacob Zuma administration because capacity for policy thinking is

critical. It would seem that the Thabo Mbeki administration focused specifically on policy. The Nelson Mandela administration, which was a Government of National Unity, was largely focused on various policy, legislative and institutional reforms with very limited capacity for policy making, coordination and monitoring and evaluation as well as long-term planning.

Keywords: policy making, coordination, presidency, planning, monitoring, evaluation, public policy

Introduction

There have been ongoing debates about the leadership styles of the post-apartheid presidents and what they prioritised. Much of these debates started during Thabo Mbeki's presidential tenure. It has intensified during the Jacob Zuma presidential administration. Since he left Office, Mbeki has been writing public letters to clarify and or explain his role and leadership during his tenure as president of the Republic of South Africa. Govender (2016) has reflected on the Mbeki letters, distilling lessons from the letters. Other publications on Mbeki's administration also add insights. Among many, Nooyo (2015) focused closely on the Mbeki administration. However, he does not address important details of policy making and coordination. Moreover, and given that the publication occurred during the Zuma presidential tenure, Nooyo (2015) is silent on the Zuma administration's policy making, coordination, planning as well as monitoring and evaluation. Although this paper draws from it, the review of the political economy of South Africa since 1994 by Gumede (2015) discusses policy making, law making, coordination, planning as well as monitoring and evaluation rather broadly and did not make any deliberate comparisons between the different post-apartheid administrations. To some extent, the analysis of social and economic progress since 1994 in South Africa (also by Gumede) examines the performance of the successive of post-apartheid administrations – see the review of Gumede (2016) by Moagi (2016).

This contribution provides a comparative perspective on the Mbeki and Zuma tenures vis-à-vis policy making and coordination, as well as associated aspects, instead of discussing only one of the two post-apartheid presidents' administrations separately. The Mandela administration is not discussed because the Mandela administration did not attend to policy making and coordination,

and especially monitoring and evaluation and planning as such. The focus here is deliberately at the national government level and the care-taker presidency of Kgalema Motlanthe (September 2008 to June 2009) is discussed as part of the third (i.e. Jacob Zuma) administration.

There are largely continuities and changes in emphasis in the two administrations. Hence the comparison instead of focusing on one of them. It is in this context that the paper discusses policy making, coordination, planning, and monitoring and evaluation in a South African context. The contribution focuses on the evolution of these practices, and the role of main actors such as Presidents, the Presidency, state and non-state actors. Many initiatives regarding coordination that were started by Mbeki have continued, with a few minor changes. The disbanding of the Policy Unit in the Presidency in 2010 is, however, a major change which appears to have affected the effectiveness of policy coordination in the Zuma era. The planning as well as monitoring and evaluation processes that started during the Mbeki era have been firmed up in the Zuma era.

Presidents, Presidencies, Policy Making, Coordination, Planning and Monitoring

The position of Head of State and or Government in many States takes various forms and titles. For instance, in certain States the Head of State is referred to as the President or in some instances the Prime-Minister (Foakes 2014, 110). Yet, in certain instances like in the United Kingdom (UK) the administrative arm of government is led by a Prime Minister, but the Head of State of the United Kingdom is the hereditary Monarch-King or Queen (House of Commons 2015,7). The Federal Republic of Germany is another interesting case study in this context. In Germany, executive power is in hands of the Federal Chancellor and his/her Ministers otherwise known as a Cabinet, although there is a President in Germany and this position is ceremonial with limited powers such as the President being able to dissolve the Parliament if the Federal Chancellor loses a motion (Lecgo 2015, 1).

In a democracy, a President and the Presidency are important in many ways – the President is a Commander-in-Chief as in the case of South Africa. As Butler (2013, 1) puts it, in the context of South Africa, “the president is also the head of state: he is a symbolic national leader who is

expected to embody the values of aspirations of his people”. It is for this reason that many political theorists contend that the position of Executive Head or President are critical positions of power and anyone wielding this power needs to understand that he/she must run the State effectively.

In constitutional democracies, like South Africa, the President is elected. However, because South Africa follows a proportional representation voting system the political party with majority votes end up with its president as a president of the country. The president, in any country and in a constitutional democracy in particular, has a very significant role to play. Politically, a president oversees the entirety of the work of government and society. The president has to steer society, including its economy, etcetera. By implication, also in the context of South Africa, the President must lead decision making, policies, coordination, planning as well as monitoring and evaluation. Put differently, the Presidency, which is led by a President (and it also comprises the Deputy President), has to ensure that responsibilities for decision making, policies, coordination, planning as well as Monitoring and Evaluation (M and E) are properly discharged.

It is important, as will be explained in this paper, to understand that M and E is a twofold process which when done correctly operates as a singular public policy instrument. Monitoring is defined as “a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds” (PSC 2008, 3). Evaluation is understood as being “an assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of an ongoing or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability” (IFRC 2011, 13). When these two processes are brought together within the public policy process to form a singular, but two-fold process, policy makers and practitioners are able to leverage core values of both sets of concepts to ensure that planning and implementation are done correctly.

It is for this reason that policy making is the art of decision-making regarding public policies. As explained elsewhere, public policy refers to “all formal and publicly known decisions of governments that come about through predetermined channels in a particular administration”

(Gumede 2008, 8). The making of policies involves many stages, at least in theory. For governments, in practice, politics has a huge role to play: the election manifestos of political parties influence policy making. An important aspect of policy making is coordination. However, it is important to firstly understand that the concept of coordination within public policy does not have a singular definition, but rather has key characteristics and focus and is dependent on the context used (Matei and Tatiana-Camelia, 2014, 2).

In short, in the context of this paper, coordination involves bringing together all the relevant structures and role players, particularly within government. The different government departments that are affected by a particular public policy or would be involved in its implementation should be brought together while the policy is being developed. Coordination, therefore, entails processes, systems and structures that have a role in the design and implementation of a policy. Then there is planning, which Pea (1982, 5) says “is a complex form of symbolic action that consists of consciously preconceiving a sequence of actions that will be sufficient for achieving a goal. It is set apart from undeliberated action, which is not preconceived”. Planning can be short, medium and long term. In South Africa, planning takes the form of annual plans of government departments that are informed by the Medium Term Strategic Framework which should also inform the long-term plan. The *Vision 2030* (i.e. the National Development Plan) is that long-term plan for South Africa, although some debate whether it is a plan or a vision or a development agenda for the country.

Background

The African National Congress (ANC) has been South Africa’s governing party since the introduction of a non-racial and non-sexist democracy in 1994, supported by the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) who are the ANC’s Tripartite Alliance partners. The dominant ideology underpinning the ANC is captured in its broad agenda, the National Democratic Revolution-NDR (Slovo 1988, 7). The NDR is described as a process through which the National Democratic Society (NDS) will be achieved; a society that is empowered socially, economically and politically – a society that is non-racial, non-sexist, prosperous and democratic (Venter 2012, 4). At the core of the ANC’s political

policies and government policies to date, therefore, are precepts of the NDR. Important aspects of the NDR formed a major component of the Reconstruction and Development Programme during the Mandela presidency in 1994. The RDP was or is essentially about meeting the basic needs of South Africans and nation building. In 1996, the South African government unveiled a Macroeconomic Framework: Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR). GEAR aimed to achieve economic growth and employment opportunities to address poverty. Since the Zuma administration in 2009, it instituted the National Development Plan (Vision 2030). The National Planning Commission (NPC) unveiled the NDP in 2012 as a new guiding framework for future South African economic growth and development.

The next subsection discusses state actors involved in policy making. The negotiated political and democratic settlement implied that the State needed to work with everyone affected. This echoes the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) (hereafter the Constitution) that states that South Africa belongs to all who live in it. Then follows a discussion of non-state actors which is followed by an analysis of the evolution of policy making since 1994. Before concluding, planning, monitoring and evaluation are discussed. The Conclusion also briefly highlights the evolution of the role and functions of the Mbeki and Zuma presidencies, also depicting implications for weakening policy development and coordination capacity.

The Role of the State in Policy Making in South Africa

At the highest level, the national legislative authority in South Africa is vested with Parliament, which consists of two houses, namely the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) (South African Constitution, 1996). In democratic states, the functions of the legislature involve representing the public, making laws, and exercising political oversight. The Constitution describes the NA as a body elected to represent the people and to ensure government by the people (South African Constitution, 1996). The primary function of the NA is to pass legislation. In exercising its legislative power, traditionally, the NA considers, passes, amends or rejects any legislation before it, and/or initiates or prepares legislation (Gumede 2011). The other functions of NA include holding the executive accountability, functions relating

to its own activities, and considering public petitions. One of the main objectives of Parliament is to ensure public participation in policy making and law making.

The NCOP represents the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the national sphere of government (South African Constitution, 1996). The NCOP carries out this mandate by participating in the national legislative processes and providing a national forum for consideration of provincial issues. In exercising its legislative power, traditionally, the NCOP may also consider to pass, amend, propose amendments to or reject any legislation before the NCOP, and initiate or prepare legislation falling within a particular functional area. Like the National Assembly, the NCOP is required by law to facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the NCOP and its committees in a regulated manner.

The South African law-making process is extensive and involves numerous actors and state organs (Gumede 2015). Typically, when draft legislation reaches the Parliament (from government departments as an example), where it is tabled as a Bill, it would have gone through a lengthy process. This process generally begins with an ANC and/or government Discussion Document, which could be a Green Paper or succeed it in time. This is normally drafted in the relevant Ministry or Department to demonstrate its policy orientation and objectives. The Green Paper is then published for public comment. The Green Paper process is followed by a more refined Discussion Document, called a White Paper, which is a broad statement of government policy (Gumede 2011). Also, this is normally drafted by the relevant Department or a task team designated by the relevant Minister of that department. Public comments are again invited from interested parties. The relevant parliamentary portfolio or joint committees may propose amendments or other proposals, and then return the policy paper to the Ministry for further discussion and final decisions.

The White Paper is sent to the State Law Advisors who assess the legal and technical implications of the draft legislation. It is only after all these processes that the legislation is introduced to the Parliament as a Bill. Parliament requires that the Bill must have already gone through public participation processes. As described in Gumede (2008), to ensure public consultation, government line-function departments have to indicate in the explanatory

memorandum all the bodies consulted in the drafting of the Bill. Although legislation is promulgated by Parliament in joint sittings of the two houses, it is effectively at Cabinet level and in its committees and clusters that the substance of the draft legislation is examined (Gumede 2011).

At the provincial level, the legislative authority is vested in the provincial legislature, governed only by the Constitution (South African Constitution, 1996). As indicated in Gumede (2011), if a provincial constitution exists, the provincial legislature must act in accordance with the national and provincial constitutions. In exercising its legislative power, a provincial legislature may consider, pass, amend or reject any Bill before it; and initiate or prepare legislation. A provincial legislature has to ensure that all provincial executive organs are accountable to it; and maintain oversight of the exercise of provincial executive authority in the province, including the implementation of legislation; and any provincial organ of state (Gumede 2015). As in the case of the NA and the NCOP, a provincial legislature must ensure public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the legislature and its committee (Gumede 2008).

South Africa has what could be called quasi-federalism (Simeone 1998, De Villiers and Sindane 2011). As discussed in Gumede (2008), there are those in government that felt that the quasi-federal governance arrangements constrain effective service delivery due to limitations imposed on the central government in determining and shaping the affairs of provincial/subnational governments, though the Constitution does provide some recourse in extreme cases such as when there is breakdown in the functioning of a provincial/subnational government.

The third level and local sphere of policy making in the South Africa State consists of (metros, local and district) municipalities that mainly implement national and provincial legislation. The executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in its Municipal Council (Gumede 2011). A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation in terms of the Constitution. In terms of the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000), municipalities also have the right to exercise their powers without national or a provincial government compromising or impeding their ability or right to exercise their powers or perform their functions. In addition, as the Municipal Systems

Act indicates, municipalities may make and administer bylaws for the effective administration of the matters for which they are responsible.

Public participation in all spheres of government and in the policy making processes is a constitutional obligation. However, it is mainly the local government sphere that is a product of a conscious policy and institutional design to ensure accessibility of government to communities and citizens. Section 152 (1) of the Constitution 1996) indicates that some of the objects of local government are:

- a) providing for a democratic and accountable government for local communities;
- b) ensuring the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; and
- c) encouraging the involvement of communities and community organizations in the matters of local government.

In relation to parliamentarians and members of legislatures, there are some ways in which parliamentarians and members of legislatures play a role in policy making (Anderson, 2003). However, this seems to be happening largely at a political level. For instance, all parliamentarians, at least on the side of the ruling party, participate in most policy discussions in various platforms of the ruling party (Gumede 2008). Since 1994, policy discussions in the ANC informs policy orientation, objectives and implementation for the government in South Africa (Maseng, 2014).

Lastly, with regard to the President and the Presidency, the Constitution of South Africa (1996) indicated that the President is the Head of State and Head of the National Executive. Among the main functions of the President, as spelt out in the Constitution, involve overseeing Bills, making strategic appointments including appointing Commissions of Inquiry and oversight on policy and implementation. As Section 85 of Chapter 5, subsection 2, of the Constitution (1996), indicates, “the President exercises executive authority, together with the other members of the Cabinet, by (a) implementing national legislation except where the Constitution or an Act of Parliament provides otherwise (b) developing and implementing national policy (c) co-ordinating the functions of state departments and administrations (d) preparing and initiating legislation; and (e)

performing any other executive function provided for in the Constitution or in national legislation.”

It is in this context that, given the focus of this paper, the Presidency is viewed as having oversight, if not responsibility, with a view to policy, coordination, planning and monitoring as well as evaluation. The South African Presidency has played these roles and functions through the Policy Unit in the past (Gumede 2008) and now through the various departments in the Presidency (Gumede 2015). The question of how well the roles and functions have been undertaken, would require a separate paper/study. What seems to be the case though is that policy thinking and coordination appears to have declined during the Zuma administration. This is an irony or paradox because there are more technocrats now in the various departments in the Presidency than there were in the Mbeki administration. It might very well be that the Policy Unit had the standing that allowed it to better play the roles and fulfil the functions of the Presidency than is the case with the disparate departments in the Presidency. It might also be that the Zuma administration decided to focus on implementation, assuming that there were policies (and that the challenge had to do with implementation), hence the many implementation committees set up during the first term of Zuma’s administration.

The Role of Non-State Actors in Policy Making in South Africa

A significant aspect of the policy making and implementation processes in South Africa is the involvement of non-state actors, or what public policy literature broadly refers to as quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations “quangos” (Kuye 2016, 86). This approach is supposedly in accordance with the democratic nature of the South African State, giving voice and respect to the governed from different sectors of society. However, since 1994 the extent to which quangos play a role in the policy making and implementation processes in South Africa has varied.

In a quest to achieve impartiality and independence of views of the public, government has complied with the Constitution and established the so-called Chapter Nine institutions in order to strengthen constitutional democracy (Gumede 2008). These institutions account to the NA and include the Public Protector, the South African Human Rights Commission, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Cultural, Religious and Linguistic

Communities, the Commission for Gender Equality, the Youth Commission, and the Electoral Commission (See Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution). The Constitution protects the independence of these State institutions, allowing them to contribute to the policy making, implementing and monitoring process “without fear, favour or prejudice” (Constitution, 1996).

A number of other public and private institutions, bodies and agencies are also active role players in policy making processes. First, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) comprises government, organized business and labour as well as community representatives at national level to deliberate on socio-economic issues (Ferreira 2005). As explained in Gumede (2011), organized business is represented by the Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) while organized labour is represented by the main labour federations in South Africa, whereas the organized community consists of, amongst others, the South African Youth Council, the National Women’s Coalition, the South African National Civics Organization, Disabled People South Africa, the Financial Sector Coalition and the National Co-operatives Association of South Africa.

Nedlac works very closely with government departments such as the Departments of Labour, Trade and Industry, Finance (National Treasury), Public Works and others to achieve inclusive socio-economic decision-making, and to promote economic growth, equity and social inclusion. With regard to women, the Mbeki administration, in particular, the South African government engaged with the South African Women in Dialogue (Sawid) and the so-called National Gender Machinery (NGM) on policy issues related to poverty eradication and development. Sawid is an independent and impartial South African women’s platform for dialogue, to improve the status of women by engaging national government, to formulate and inform community, provincial and national agendas addressing the needs of South African women (Gumede 2008).

There are other platforms that the successive post-apartheid administrations have pursued. In the health sector, for instance, the government has also established the South African National Aids Council (Sanac). With regard to knowledge-sharing networks, it appears that government does not have a structured relationship with think-tanks and academics around policy making and implementation (McGann 2012, 7). Most government departments and the different spheres of government seem to relate with researchers or research institutions as and when there are specific

research or policy issues requiring expertise outside the public sector (e.g. development of anti-corruption model in early 1990s) (Van Vuuren 2014, 27). This could be a function of the (rare) South African case that most academics, scholars and researchers were appointed to government. Most of those scholars and researchers have since returned to the research/academic sector. For instance, some of the senior officials during the Thabo Mbeki administration (i.e. Joel Netshitenzhe and Alan Hirsch) have started research organizations or academic programmes.

During the Mbeki administration, the government established various consultative working groups with various non-state role players in the different sectors. As Gumede (2008, 14) explains, the consultative working groups were “constituted by members outside government as well as selected Cabinet ministers and senior advisors...scheduled meetings of working groups were twice a year to exchange policy and programme perspectives around topical issues affecting them and those they represent.” Working groups included focus areas such as the youth, women, business, higher education, commercial agriculture, trade unions, and religious leaders. Working groups were not prioritized in the first term of President Zuma but it seems that there have been processes to re-prioritize them during the second term (e.g. holding some meetings through the Presidential working groups on business, the mining sector, youth development and interfaith (The Presidency 2015, 5).

Lastly, various other government-public consultations have been pursued (e.g. the President and Deputy President use other platforms such as the presidential black economic advisory council, the presidential infrastructure coordinating commission, the President’s coordinating council), to forge stronger partnerships within government (The Presidency 2015, 5). For instance, during the Mbeki administration, the *Izimbizo* programme was instituted. *Izimbizo* refers to public gatherings. Typically, the President, Ministers and advisors visited communities to engage on issues affecting these communities or issues on which communities wanted government intervention. The Zuma administration has a similar programme, called *Siyahlola*, which refers to investigation or overseeing. It would seem that the *Siyahlola* programme was not meant to replace *Izimbizo*, but rather that the two initiatives complement each other. It appears that, in the Zuma administration, *Izimbizo* and *Siyahlola* involve effectively similar activities, or their goals seem similar. The difference could be that *Siyahlola* also involves surprise visits to specific

communities. Another difference is that *Siyahlola's* orientation is on monitoring specific outcome areas such as health, education and others, whereas *Izimbizo* is an open community meeting with the President and his Cabinet (Gumede 2015).

There are [or were] other initiatives similar to *Izimbizo* and *Siyahlola* such as the War on Poverty Campaign that started during the last years of the Mbeki administration and gained momentum during the care-taker administration of President Motlanthe (but died around the time the Policy Unit was disbanded). Gumede (2014, 285) explains that, in 2007, the South African government “explicitly attempted a new approach to reducing poverty (i.e. through the ‘War on Poverty’ as a new anti-poverty programme).”

Evolution of Presidential Policy Coordination in post-Apartheid South Africa

One of the key institutions and actors in the policy making landscape in post-apartheid South Africa – besides Parliament and those referred to earlier – had been the Policy Unit in the presidency (Gumede 2008; Butler 2013). Essentially, during its existence, the Policy Unit was the main clearing-house in the policy making processes in South Africa. It undertook policy development and policy analysis, policy coordination and policy advice. The Policy Unit also conducted medium- to long-range planning, and government-wide monitoring and evaluation. However, with the establishment of a new department (called the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, DPME) during the Zuma presidency in 2010, government-wide monitoring and evaluation were moved to the DPME. With the establishment of the National Planning Commission (NPC) and the Ministry of Planning in the Presidency, also in 2010, policy and government planning were to be centralised and undertaken within the Planning Ministry and the NPC. A Planning Secretariat was also established in 2010 to coordinate these activities. The Ministry of Planning and the NPC appear to have mainly focused on developing the NDP, which was unveiled in 2012.

The Policy Unit conducted research, provided analysis, advice, planning and provided strategic support to the presidency and government on socio-economic development, justice, governance and international affairs (Gumede 2008). The Policy Unit was comprised of five main policy

sectors, namely crime prevention and security, economic, social, justice, governance, administration as well as international relations. As explained in Gumede (2008), there were four additional sub-units/special programmes, including the Office of the Status of Women (OSW), the Office on the Rights of Children (ORC), the Office on the Status of Disabled Persons (OSDP), and the Youth Desk. Policy coordination relating to gender and children's rights evolved after 2009 due to the formation of another new ministry and department (Department of Women, Children and People with Disabilities).

As Butler (2013) explains, the Department of Women, Children and People with Disabilities was initially, when it was established, a stand-alone and an independent ministry, but was later moved to the Presidency in 2014. It was then renamed the Department of Women in the presidency. As for youth affairs and development, a Deputy Minister was appointed while the portfolio of people with disabilities was moved to the National Department of Social Development. In addition, the presidency has established a working group for people with disabilities.

Mirroring policy sectors in the Policy Unit were the five Forum of South African Directors-General (FOSAD) clusters (Layman 2003). The Policy Unit worked closely with the FOSAD clusters and acted as a link between the cabinet and its committees, and the respective FOSAD clusters (Gumede 2008). Cabinet committees mirrored these clusters with one exception: there were two committees mirrored by one policy sector (i.e. the economic sector). It could be argued that this was largely the function, in the Thabo Mbeki administration, of further prioritization of job creation and the importance of investments or the broader economy (Mathebula 2004). In essence, all other economic matters were dealt with through the general economic cabinet committee whilst those issues that were considered critical were handled by the cabinet committee on Investment and Employment (Gumede 2008).

In addition, the cabinet secretariat largely deals with logistics and documenting of decisions of cabinet and its committees (Layman 2003, 12). A planning framework guided the interface between various policy making structures, by ensuring that specific activities were undertaken at specific mutually predetermined dates. For instance, the planning cycle/framework specified when departments should make budget bids to the national treasury and what should happen

before and in-between bi-annual Cabinet *makgotla* (gatherings) that refers to extended three-day cabinet meetings. Typically, one of these *makgotla* occurred early, and another was in the middle of the year. The planning framework further detailed what would happen at provincial and local governments at various points in time, such as when state of provinces' addresses (i.e. speeches by premiers) should take place.

There were many other points of interface and integration that were informal and improved policy coordination and integration (Layman 2003). For example, there were informal platforms between ministers and directors-general apart from FOSAD, in preparation for cabinet *makgotla* or bi-monthly clusters' progress reports to cabinet. Ongoing interactions between the top management of the policy unit and the ANC also occurred. Informal interactions occurred between ministers, deputy ministers or directors-general and the policy unit. There were also various inter-ministerial committees in which senior technocrats of the policy unit participated (Gumede 2011). It could be argued that the disbanding of the policy unit has left a lacuna in coordination in the presidential, ruling party and government policy making processes.

In 2014, there were additional changes during the Zuma tenure. The ministry of planning was modified and renamed the minister for planning in the presidency (The Presidency 2015). The mandate of DPME continued being about ensuring compliance with monitoring and evaluation processes by departments, but not necessarily to coordinate policies and programmes. In addition, the increase in the number of departments in the presidency could stymie policy coordination (Gumede 2015). For instance, the coordination between the DPME, the Department of Women and the presidency itself with two ministries might cause a state of limbo as there is no clear chain of command between ministers of departments housed at the presidency. Institutionally, these departments are housed at the presidency, but organisationally and operationally their work does not mirror each other. It does not follow, for instance, that all ministers in the presidency have direct access to the President. Policy coordination might also be constrained by changes such as senior technocrats in the Presidency no longer attending cabinet meetings and associated structures as was the case during the Mbeki administration (Gumede 2015).

However, one of the potential positive interventions in policy coordination introduced by the Zuma administration in April 2015 is the Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission (PICC) to ensure that all infrastructure programmes are planned for and coordinated through the PICC chaired by the President. It coordinates the public sector infrastructure programme (The Presidency, 2015). With the increase in capacities in the Presidency broadly – as in the numbers of technocrats – and the increase in capacities in the private offices of the President and of the deputy president, it might be that policy coordination would eventually return to being, if not better than, the levels observed during the Mbeki administration.

Governmental Institutional Arrangements for Monitoring and Evaluation

After cabinet's approval to develop the Government-Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System (GWMES) in 2005, a policy framework was published in 2007, and changes in the configuration of government (departments) introduced in 2010. The GWMES policy document outlined, amongst other things, key government institutions to develop, oversee and evaluate the monitoring and evaluation (M and E) system in government. The National Evaluation Policy Framework (2011), which was published four years after the GWMES framework, mentions the following as priority institutions in the M and E system that should be endorsed as the 'alpha and omega' of evaluation throughout the public sector, namely The Presidency, the DPME, Treasury, the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), the Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA) (converted to the government school), the Auditor General, Offices of Premiers, the Office of Public Service Commission, the Department of Cooperative Governance (DCOG), the South African Monitoring and Evaluation Association (SAMEA), and South African universities.

After the adoption of the NDP as government's most significant development policy document, the Planning Ministry was dissolved as indicated earlier and most of its functions were moved or subsumed within the DPME to form one large department dealing with planning, monitoring and evaluation. The DPME, from 2012 onwards, excluded performance which replaced planning to indicate that the Planning Commission work or the planning function became part of DPME. Although institutional arrangements for monitoring and evaluation have changed since 1994 and

since 2004, in particular, the major changes in monitoring and evaluation have taken place in the successive Zuma administrations. The erstwhile Policy Unit had some monitoring and evaluation functions, but the new departments have far more capacity and functions for monitoring and evaluation (Gumede 2015). It could be said that the golden thread, however, remains that of integrated governance. The new departments like the erstwhile Policy Unit, and with increased capacities in the Presidency, should be further improving integrated governance.

Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation as a Form of Governance and Central/Coordinated Policy Planning

As part of institutionalizing an M and E ethos in government, President Zuma undertakes three types of monitoring and evaluation activities. The first one is the signing of performance agreements with all Cabinet members which began in his first term in April 2010 (The Presidency, 2015). These performance agreements are signed at the beginning of each term of office. The second initiative/activity is yearly meetings with Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Directors-General where the President assesses performance against signed agreements. The DPME assists the Presidency with the technical aspects of scoring the performance of Ministers and Deputy Ministers. The third monitoring exercise by President Zuma involves community monitoring visits together with unannounced visits to public frontline service providers as indicated earlier.

Lastly, one of the main policy developments that characterize the Zuma administration is the focus on monitoring and evaluation as well as elevating the planning function premised on a view that the challenge facing the public sector in South Africa relates to implementation than policy. However, it would seem that DPME does not coordinate policies per se. It appears to only monitor programmes outcomes against the government priority areas.

Conclusion

This paper discussed policy development, coordination, planning, monitoring and evaluation since 1994. Mbeki is said to have started policy coordination, planning and monitoring and evaluation in government when he was still the Deputy President (1994-1999). The paper

demonstrates that there are largely continuities and changes vis-à-vis policy making and coordination – the changes are largely in the shift in emphasis from policy development to implementation. It appears that there has been weakening of the effectiveness of the policy (and law) making processes and capacities since the disbanding of the Policy Unit in 2010. This has major implications or both policy and political consequences, highlighted below.

Taking into account that the responsibility of the Presidency involves ensuring that duties of the Head of State (who is also the Head of the Executive) are carried out as discussed in this paper as informed by the Constitution, it can be argued that the Mbeki administration appears to have carried out the roles and functions better than the Zuma administration. In particular, the Policy Unit ensured the developing and implementation of policy as well as the coordination of the functions of departments. The consequences of weakening policy thinking and coordination which came with the disbanding of the Policy Unit are there for everyone to see, so to speak. The increase in public protests (Gumede 2016), as an example, is one indicator that coordination has declined in government. The frequent Cabinet reshuffling by the President might be another example implying that the President is endlessly trying to improve the functioning of government and his Presidency.

In conclusion, poor policy thinking and weak coordination imply that public policies might no longer be addressing the correct problem. Because context often always changes, policy should adapt. Poor policy thinking means that it might take long to reform policy or the reforms might be inappropriate (as in delayed reforms or policies not addressing the correct problem). The shift from the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative to the New Growth Path is one example to suggest that there was not much policy thinking. The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative was, as an economic policy, addressing redistributive issues (which was necessary after the GEAR policy). The New Growth Path is more of an infrastructural development agenda than an economic policy (Gumede 2016). Regarding weak coordination capacity, it can be argued that the delays in implementing the National Development Plan (as imperfect as it might be) has to do with lack of coordination, because all partners had already endorsed the NDP – what has been missing is coordinating all the partners and ensure implementation of the policy proposals contained in the NDP. These issues point to weak leadership in Statecraft. The Mbeki

administration, arguably, demonstrated leadership in policy thinking and coordination as was epitomized by the work of the erstwhile Policy Unit.

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